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“In due time, the theory of aesthetics will have to account not only for the 
delight in Kantian beauty and the sublime, but for the phenomena like 
aesthetic violence and the aestheticization of violence, of aesthetic abuse and 
intrusion, the blunting of sensibility, its perversion, and its poisoning.”2  
Terrorism and Aesthetics 
It has become increasingly clear that the arts, and the aesthetic, more 
generally, occupy no hallowed ground but live on the everyday earth of 
our lives. Recognition is growing that the aesthetic is a pervasive 
dimension of the objects and activities of daily life.
3
 Perceptual 
experiences that possess the characteristics of aesthetic appreciation are 
marked by a focused sensibility we enjoy for its intrinsic perceptual 
satisfaction. We typically have such experiences with works of art and 
with nature, but they are equally possible in other occasions and with other 
kinds of objects. Such experiences engage us in an intensely sensory field 
                                                 
1 This has appeared in my book, Sense and Sensibility: The Aesthetic Transformation 
of the Human World (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2010), 175-192, and earlier in 
Contemporary Aesthetics Vol. 7 (2009). I would like to thank the anonymous 
reviewers for Contemporary Aesthetics for their helpful comments on this essay. 
2 Katya Mandoki, Everyday Aesthetics: Prosaics, the Plan of Culture and Social 
Identities (Ashgate, 2007), p. 42. 
3 Recent work includes Katya Mandoki, op. cit.; Yuriko Saito, Everyday Aesthetics 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).); The Aesthetics of Everyday Life, ed. 
Andrew Light and Jonathan M. Smith (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2005).  
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in which we participate wholly and without reservation, as we customarily 
do with works of art. The objects and occasions, however, may be 
ordinary ones, such as eating, hanging laundry, engaging in social 
relations, or operating a perfectly functioning automobile or other 
mechanism. The range of such occasions is limitless, and this adds to the 
significance of the aesthetics of the everyday. 
Such an expansion of the aesthetic has important consequences. 
Perhaps the most striking is need to acknowledge that the range of 
aesthetic experience includes more than the appreciative engagement with 
art and nature. But not only does the aesthetic extend to the uncustomary; 
it encompasses the full range of human normative experience. Experiences 
of the aesthetic include not only the elevated and noble but the 
reprehensible, degrading, and destructive. This is so not as the result of an 
arbitrary decision to include them but from actual experience and practice. 
The aesthetic offers a full and direct grasp of the human world. That it 
may include violence and depravity is not the fault of aesthetics but of that 
world. 
A salient symptom of that world is terrorism. Its wanton violence and 
uncontrolled destruction are appalling. But easy moral outrage offers no 
understanding, and only by grasping the meanings and significance of 
terrorism can we hope to deal with it effectively. Let me begin with the 
Happening, for the Happening can provide a forceful illumination of the 
aesthetic of terrorism. 
Not that Happenings took negative form. A syncretic, visual-theatrical 
artistic development of the 1960s, Happenings were a deliberate artistic 
innovation intent on transgressing all the hard boundaries that protected 
the arts and made them safe. In Happenings audiences became the 
performers, no clearly circumscribed object could be identified as the 
work of art, aesthetic distance was relinquished to the active engagement 
of the audience, artistic genres were fused into unrecognizable 
combinations and, most significantly, the boundary between art and life 
disappeared. Happenings were often playful, even festive occasions that 
danced over the pieties of conventional artistic axioms.  
Some commentators quickly recognized that the importance of the 
Happening lay beyond its iconoclasm and entertainment value. One of 
them was Régis Debray, a young French radical intellectual, who 
"regarded a revolution as a coordinated series of guerrilla Happenings. 
Some of his admirers, in fact, took part in Happenings as training for 
future Happenings when they would use guns and grenades."
4
 What many 
                                                 
4 Arnold Berleant, Art and Engagement (Philadelphia: Temple, 1992), p. 40. 
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had considered a bizarre exaggeration following the dismissal of 
traditional artistic forms turns out to have been an uncanny pre-vision of 
the world half a century later. The net of terrorism in which the world is 
now enmeshed is all-enclosing. But how can terrorism be considered in the 
same sense as art? The question itself seems outrageous.  
Happenings made a radical break from the aesthetic tradition by 
denying that art occupies its own exclusive realm separate from the world 
outside. Yet it was not only Happenings that rejected this tradition; many 
other artistic developments in the twentieth century deliberately crossed 
that boundary. The presumptive difference between the world of art and 
the world of daily life lies at the source of such perennial problems in 
aesthetics as the status of truth and illusion in art, the moral effects of art 
works, and the nature of artistic representation. Such continuing issues, all 
of which can be traced back to Plato, find in artistic autonomy the domain 
of human freedom, as Kant had claimed.
5
 Yet at the same time, separating 
the arts from daily life establishes an autonomy that, by philosophic 
decree, vitiates the force of the arts and ignores their power. 
The tradition of restricting and removing art from the world of daily 
life dates from Plato’s suspicion that the arts can have a morally 
degenerating influence. Expressed most famously in The Republic, it led 
him to advocate strict controls on the use of the arts in education and to 
propose censorship.
6
 This, of course, was related to Plato’s mistrust of 
sense experience, which he considered the source of illusion and false 
belief. These views were reinforced and enlarged by Kant, who claimed 
early in the modern period that the autonomy of judgments of taste is 
entirely independent of the existence of the object of our satisfaction and is 
not bound up with practical interest.
7
  
The effect of these ideas on the history of philosophy has been 
profound. Plato’s mistrust of the senses and artistic independence and his 
failure to recognize the imaginative contribution that the arts can make to 
education and moral development joined with Kant’s denial of full 
aesthetic satisfaction to the interests of daily life. Together they functioned 
effectively to muzzle the power of the arts. Yet once we recognize the 
active interplay that occurs between art objects and activities and the 
                                                 
5 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, (J. H. Bernard (New York: Hafner, 1951) 
§4. See A. Berleant, "Aesthetics and the Contemporary Arts,” The Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism, XXIX, 2 (Winter l970), l55-l68. Reprinted in Arnold 
Berleant, Re-thinking Aesthetics, Rogue Essays on Aesthetics and the Arts 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), ch. 4.  
6 The Republic Bk. II, 377A-382; Bk. III, 376E-403B. 
7 Immanuel Kant, op. cit. , First Book, §2-5. 
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world in which they exist, we find vast new opportunities for power and 
influence.  
The force inherent in this relation has not been lost on the modern 
state. For philosophical aesthetics deliberately to ignore the political 
potential and use of the arts is to hand that power over to others whose 
values, standards, and behaviour are often ignorant, manipulative, and 
self-aggrandizing. The traditional separation of aesthetics from daily life 
has freely allowed the political appropriation, often the misappropriation, 
of the arts. That is why governments practice “news management” and 
other forms of censorship, why they “stage” conferences, rallies, and other 
political events, why they promote “official” art, and why they persecute 
artists who do not conform to their purposes and destroy their works. Art 
is dangerous, and Kant got it backwards when he placed morality and art 
in separate domains. 
In the interpenetration of art and the human world are the grounds for a 
new aesthetic vision and the need to articulate it.
8
 When Happenings fused 
art with the everyday world, they did so as art. But what about presumably 
non-art objects that are directly perceived as art? There is, of course, found 
art, where an object is extrapolated from the everyday world, segregated, 
and framed: a piece of driftwood, a bouquet of field flowers, and, of 
course, the perennial urinal. Art is claimed where none was intended. 
Some instances of found art are benign, some provocative, others 
deliberately inflammatory. They say nothing about the motives of those 
who did the making and for whom the idea of art was probably far from 
mind. What found art does do is center our attention on an object or event 
in a way that resembles the intense focus we give to things designated as 
art by an artist, an institution, or the art world. Like Happenings, found art 
places art squarely in the ordinary world. Can this apply to acts of 
terrorism? 
Some of the most striking claims of art for things outside the art world 
were responses to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The avant-garde composer 
Karlheinz Stockhausen called them "the greatest work of art ever….the 
greatest work of art for the whole cosmos," "a jump out of security, the 
everyday." And the British artist Damien Hirst excluded art from all moral 
judgment, arguing that the violence, horror, and death associated with 
                                                 
8 Developing such an aesthetic has been the incentive of most of my previous 
work. See especially Re-thinking Aesthetics, Rogue Essays on Aesthetics and the 
Arts (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), Art and Engagement (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1991), and The Aesthetic Field: A Phenomenology of Aesthetic 
Experience (Springfield, Ill.: C. C. Thomas l970). Second (electronic) edition, with 
a new Preface, 2000.  
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Ground Zero (the name given to the site of the demolished New York 
World Trade Center) do not rule out the possibility that film footage of the 
attack could be "visually stunning" and resemble works of art.
9
 Indeed, 
perceiving that footage as art may be the ultimate act of framing. Whether 
these events can be considered found art can be debated, but the label we 
give them is incidental. Of more concern here is the claim that they are art 
or like art. 
Attributing artistic achievement to the perpetrators may seem revolting, 
but it would be arrogant and myopic to blithely dismiss statements like 
Hirst’s and Stockhausen’s. For we must take care not to confound the 
aesthetic with art or to consider either of these necessarily positive. To call 
the film footage of the attack visually stunning acknowledges their 
aesthetic impact. Many art works could be described in similar terms but 
yet reflect different content and moral meaning. Frederick Edwin Church’s 
“The Icebergs” (1861) is visually stunning; so are Turner’s “The Burning 
of the Houses of Lords and Commons” (1834) and Mathias Grünewald’s 
“Crucifixion” (1515).  
But so also are many natural events: sunsets, the full moon in the night 
sky, the sea in a great storm. But perceptual force alone, while aesthetic, 
does not make art. It may lie in the subject-matter of an art work but as 
part of the whole it is something different. There is a sense in which 
Stockhausen’s comment can be taken literally by regarding the 9/11 
terrorist attacks as theater. Stockhausen himself composed musical works 
with dramatic venues and enormous scale, so his calling the attacks “the 
biggest work of art there has ever been” was not entirely unpredictable or 
out of character.  
But how can we respond to these comments? Is it possible to 
disentangle the aesthetic from the moral in such a highly charged situation 
or does the moral issue entirely overpower the aesthetic one? There are no 
unequivocal answers and perhaps the consideration of Happenings, 
                                                 
9 Stockhausen, cited in Emmanouil Aretoulakis, "Aesthetic Appreciation, Ethics, 
and 9/11," Contemporary Aesthetics Vol. 6 (2008), sect. 1. Hirst, a British artist, 
called the September 11th terrorist attacks "a visually stunning artwork." Loc.cit.. 
Aretoulakis argues that "there is a need for aesthetic appreciation when 
contemplating a violent event such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks. What is more, 
appreciation of the beautiful, even in case of a 9/11, seems necessary because it is 
a key to establishing an ethical stance towards terror, life, and art. It should be 
stressed that independent aesthetic experience is not important in itself but as a 
means to cultivating an authentic moral and ethical judgment." My discussion of 
terrorism was stimulated by Aretoulakis's thoughtful and balanced consideration of 
the aesthetic significance of the 9/11 attacks.  
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transgression, and violence can help us make these assertions understandable. 
They may suggest a way of grasping them that is not immediately obvious. 
But first, however, is the matter of terrorism, itself.  
Simply to list the definitions of ‘terrorism’ would take pages. What 
they have in common is the use of violence or the threat of violence.
10
 
Most often added to the definition is that terrorism focuses on a civilian 
population with the intention of creating widespread fear, and that it is 
motivated by political or ideological objectives. Terrorism also carries an 
element of the unexpected. An element of chance enters into its choice (if 
we may call it that) of victims and sometimes in the determination of 
specific time and location, and this adds greatly to the fear that acts of 
terrorism evoke.  
It is interesting to consider that this combination of elements that 
define terrorism – violence, civilian victims, fear – does not specify the 
perpetrators. These may be indifferently radical groups of the right or left, 
military, paramilitary, governmental, or non-governmental organizations. 
The media unquestionably play a central role in promoting such fear. 
When fear-mongering is deliberate, the media that practice it could 
themselves be considered terrorist organizations, just as could other 
fomenting organizations, such as government bureaus (what Badiou calls 
“bureaucratic terrorism”11) and ad hoc groups of individuals who may be 
the perpetrators, as in the Oklahoma City bombing. It is important to 
recognize the scope of terrorism, since labeling organizations as ‘terrorist’ 
because they use or threaten violence toward a civilian population, 
regardless of their place in the social order, is revealing and sobering: they 
are not necessarily marginal. Recognizing the wide range of sources of 
terrorism helps avoid self-righteous exclusions. 
It is important to realize that the use of terror is not confined to Asia or 
the Middle East. Terror, in fact, has become a standard practice at the 
present stage of world history. Totalitarian states know well that 
terrorizing a population is the most effective way of controlling it, far 
more potent than overt force. We can recognize the climate of fear and 
terror that has spread not only throughout regions in the African, Asian, 
and South American continents; it is being deliberately implemented in 
Western industrialized nations, as well, by the use of so-called national 
security measures. Indeed, if state terror were made visible, it would 
                                                 
10 See Walter Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, 
Theologies, States of Mind (Woodrow Wilson Center Press), 1998. 
11 Alain Badiou, The Meaning of Sarkozy (London & New York: Verso, 2008), p. 
92. 
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obscure the individual acts of terror that have achieved such notoriety 
today.
12
  
Acts of terrorism are appallingly inventive and their range is extreme. 
They extend from suicide bombers in the Middle-East and the release of 
the nerve gas sarin in the Tokyo subway by the religious cult Aum 
Shinrikyo and its attempts at biological terrorism to the 9/11 suicide plane 
crashes perpetrated by Al Qaida. But we cannot exclude state terrorism in 
this portrayal: the use of overt police action and military force to control 
social activities, gangs dispatched to foment social violence, and secret 
police to instil fear. And there is also the increasingly sophisticated 
propagandistic use of the media—magazines and newspapers, TV talk 
shows and news broadcasts--to proliferate false information, obscure and 
distort current events, and instil insecurity. This is no reign of terror; we 
are living in an age of terror. 
Can terrorism be justified? 
The scope of terrorism is, then, surprisingly large and its definition 
surprisingly inclusive. At the same time it is important to recognize the 
difference between terrorism and terror and not to confuse the two. 
Terrorism is, as we have seen, the calculated use of violence or threat of 
violence against a civilian population with the intent of causing 
widespread fear for political purposes. Terror, on the other hand, is the 
overpowering emotion of intense fear. More about this later. What I am 
concerned with just now is terrorism, not terror, as such.  
Can terrorism ever be justified? What makes terrorism so morally 
appalling is that its victims are circumstantial, uninvolved, and oblivious 
of what is happening. It is a vicious lottery with equal opportunity to lose. 
The devastating results of terrorist acts are not much different from the so-
called “collateral damage” suffered by civilian populations throughout the 
whole history of warfare. Violence visited deliberately on an innocent, 
circumstantial population condemns it as one of the most heinous social 
wrongs, irrespective of any self-justifying motives. For this reason 
terrorism can never be vindicated, and terrorism practiced by a state is no 
more exempt from moral condemnation than when used as a tactic by a 
political or religious group.  
                                                 
12 One is reminded of Hobbes' characterization of the nature of war as not actual 
fighting but "in the known disposition thereto," a description that applies not only 
to what has been called a "cold war" but equally to a society in a state of continual 
fear and thus easily moved to violence. See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1660), ch. 
13. 
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But apart from the question of whether terrorism is ever justifiable, it 
must nonetheless be recognized and understood. Visible and bold acts of 
terrorism force us to acknowledge that such acts of violence are not 
aberrations committed by deluded individuals but social actions 
deliberately perpetrated by groups and for clear reasons. They may be the 
arms of state oppression or they may represent political opposition to what 
is perceived as correlative injustice. Terrorist acts are often committed in 
response to the social violence of exploitation or oppression of one 
population group by another. Yet one form of violence cannot be 
selectively justified over against another. By being directed against 
unwitting victims, all such actions are morally flawed. A violent act 
committed in response to other acts of violence is not thereby exonerated: 
both are equally condemnable. Can terrorism be considered morally 
justifiable if it is the only available means to a political or ideological end 
when there is no alternative way to redress an injustice? This is the critical 
moral question and central to understanding terrorism. 
The question of the justifiability of terrorism does not, however, 
answer the aesthetic question: are aesthetic values present in terrorist acts? 
Is there an aesthetics of terrorism? What, indeed, has terrorism to do with 
aesthetics at all? It is necessary to confront these questions because acts of 
terrorism make effective use of the techniques and skills of art and possess 
aesthetic force. Yet how can we speak of political acts such as terrorism in 
the same breath as art and the aesthetic? Must art that uses violence to 
convey a moral message and make a moral judgment be condemned when 
that message could not be made in any other way? We arrive again at the 
same moral dilemma. This is a question that must be faced by any 
argument for true democracy, the political form that claims to provide 
means for peaceful social change.
13
 Democracy or terrorism? 
The use of terrorism as a political act thus raises difficult aesthetic as 
well as moral issues, and it is important to understand terrorism, not just to 
condemn it. Indeed, considering terrorism from an aesthetic vantage point 
can cast considerable light on such acts. For these events are perceptually 
powerful, engaging not only the visual but all the senses. They are 
aesthetic because of their sensory force. These are desperate acts 
committed in order to make a moral and political statement through their 
aesthetic, that is, their sensory impact. Moreover, their inherent political 
import is a dramatic rejection of the traditional difference between art and 
reality, a feature they have in common with the modern arts.  
                                                 
13 This is a problem that stands apart from the aesthetic questions I am dealing with 
here and clearly requires its own separate treatment. As a version of the means-end 
problem, it has long history of philosophical debate. 
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Since aesthetics centers on direct sensory perception, it is clear that 
acts of terrorism have powerful aesthetic force. All those who experience 
the effects of terrorism – its chance victims, their relatives and associates, 
the organizations and institutions that are damaged, the general public, the 
social order – all can attest to its aesthetic impact. Human values – and the 
value of humans – are at stake, but we cannot measure such value 
quantitatively. How is it possible to compare or judge experience? Is a 
physical act of terrorism such as a suicide bombing worse than the 
repression of a whole population by a government policy instituted in the 
name of security, causing widespread fear and requiring overt acts of 
brutality to enforce it? Is a deliberately planned riot designed to 
manipulate a population less terrifying than, say, an attempt to poison a 
public water supply? Here, I think, differences in conditions, means, and 
consequences need to be identified and each situation appraised on its own 
terms and not by some general formula. At the same time and more 
important, such alternatives are morally unacceptable as well as rationally 
irresolvable. There is no choice between Hitler and Pol Pot. 
Unlike acts of sabotage, acts of terrorism have no direct military target. 
Perhaps it can be said that in this respect they mirror the largely self-
contained character of art. And what sort of aesthetic value can terrorism 
have? “[T]he tragic in real life will necessarily have an aesthetic 
dimension as long as the sensibility of the subject comes into play by 
judging something as being ‘tragic’.”14 Is there art in terrorism? It cannot 
be denied that much of the political effectiveness of terrorist acts comes 
from their carefully planned aesthetic impact. Indeed, their effect is 
primarily, often spectacularly theatrical. We can in fact say that such 
actions are deliberately designed to be high drama. In this sense, then, is 
theater any less appropriate a way to describe a spectacular act of terrorism 
than it is to designate military activities? Perhaps it now becomes 
understandable how an artist could consider a terrorist act a work of art. 
Can terrorism have positive moral value? Simple ascriptions of 
positive and negative value no longer fit. Such morally complex situations 
demand a different kind of analysis. If a terrorist act contributes to 
achieving social justice, can we even ask whether it is morally positive or 
negative? A Kantian analysis would find it negative, for such actions 
cannot be universalized. A utilitarian analysis might find it positive to the 
extent it contributes to political or social reform, if it does indeed have that 
consequence, rather than the redoubled use of state terror. But can we even 
                                                 
14 Mandoki, loc. cit. 
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presume to balance immediate pain, death, and destruction against future 
benefits?  
Neither of these analyses resolves the issue. Universalizability is an 
ethical principle and a logical desideratum but it is not axiomatic and 
exempt from critical reflection. And to consider consequences only 
selectively is effectively to disregard their wide-ranging fallout. Moreover, 
failing to acknowledge the full scope of consequences continues the 
common practice of hiding behind moral principles at human cost. Most 
important is the further consideration that means and ends are never 
separable. What kind of society can emerge from terror-induced change? 
Though the intent of terrorist action may be the goal of human liberation, 
the short-term effects are unavoidably negative. And its long-term effects? 
It is clear that the moral issues terrorism raises are complex. In 
traditional terms the judgment may seem clear, but under full consideration 
it becomes ambiguous. As in warfare where everyone claims right, justice 
is on every side – and so, too, is injustice. The pain of an enemy is no less 
great than one’s own. Life lost is lost life, no matter whose life it is. 
Is a spectacular terrorist act aesthetically negative or positive? It must 
be considered positive because of its dramatic force. If, however, fear and 
terror overpower perceptual experience, not only in its unwilling 
"participants" but also in its larger "audience,” so that they feel in actual 
danger, a terrorist act exceeds the possibility of aesthetic experience and so 
is aesthetically negative.
15
 So aesthetically, too, terrorism is indeterminate. 
Such situations seem, then, to be ambiguous both morally and aesthetically. 
How a terrorist act can be morally positive in any sense may be 
difficult to see. We must acknowledge that the strategy of the acts and the 
motives of the actors may be guided by the goals of liberation, of a more 
just social order, of an end to oppression and exploitation, and other 
humane objectives. But they may also be guided by the intent to preserve 
power and the social and economic privileges that accompany it. Do any 
ends ever justify terrorist means? Their morally reprehensible effects are 
so blatant that it seems inconceivable that any goal, however noble, could 
exonerate them. One cannot choose between two incommensurable 
wrongs. At the same time, even if a terrorist act could claim to be morally 
positive -- which I do not believe is possible, does this justify its aesthetic 
negativity? Morality and aesthetics are not easily distinguished here. Pain 
and delight are both inherently moral and aesthetic: The same act can be 
both morally and aesthetically positive or negative, for the moral and the 
                                                 
15 Both Burke and Kant noted the impossibility of experiencing the sublime when 
one’s safety is at risk. Cf. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §28.  
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aesthetic may be fully interdependent, inseparably fused. The very 
perpetration of a terrorist act is at the same time both aesthetic and moral, 
spectacularly destructive in both respects.  
Generalities pale before the intense particularity of terrorist acts. Every 
incident has its unique conditions and no logical decision procedure seems 
possible. Does the sheer scope and force of a terrorist act place it in a new 
and different category? Just as we cannot measure aesthetic pleasure or 
grade works of art, fear and terror are not truly quantifiable. Nor are 
consequences fully determinable. And because both their scope and their 
intensity cannot be specified precisely, they are truly inconceivable. There 
is a concept in aesthetics that denotes experience so overwhelming that it 
exceeds comprehension—the sublime, and it is worth considering whether 
the sublime could conceivably be applied to acts of terrorism.  
The Negative Sublime 
The sublime is a theory that reflects on a distinctive kind of aesthetic 
experience. While the sublime became prominent in the eighteenth century 
as a key dimension in the development of aesthetic theory, it has become 
increasingly important in recent aesthetic discourse. The starting point is 
usually Kant’s account, although Kant was not the first to elaborate a 
theory of this distinctive mode of aesthetic apprehension. Burke’s 
discussion of the sublime had come half a century before,
16
 and while 
Kant’s formulation has dominated subsequent discussions, Burke’s 
observations are particularly germane to the present one. For according to 
Burke, the central feature of the sublime is terror. The most powerful 
passion caused by the sublime in nature, he states, is astonishment, a state 
of mind with an element of horror in which all other thoughts are 
suspended. Fear at the prospect of pain or danger freezes the capacity to 
reason and act and evokes the overpowering feeling of terror. As “the 
strongest emotion which the mind is capable of feeling,” Burke maintained 
that the feeling of terror is a principal source of the sublime: “[W]hatever 
is qualified to cause terror, is a foundation capable of the sublime….” 17 
And, “Indeed, terror is in all cases whatsoever, either more openly or 
                                                 
16 Edmund Burke, Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the 
Sublime and Beautiful (1757) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). Burke did 
not originate the concept; a treatise On the Sublime is attributed to Longinus, in the 
third century CE, although its authorship and date of composition have been 
contested. 
17 Burke, ibid., Part One, Section VII; Part Two, Sections I and II; Part IV, Section 
III; pp. 36, 53-54, 119. 
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latently the ruling principle of the sublime.”18 Burke described many 
emotions associated with the sublime and the conditions under which the 
sublime may be experienced, and he cited many instances of terror incited 
by fear. His analysis, however, did not proceed beyond such descriptions.  
Kant, too, recognized fear as a feature of the (dynamical) sublime.
19
 In 
contrast with Burke, Kant developed an elaborate theory illuminated by a 
distinction between the mathematical and the dynamical sublime. In the 
first, the magnitude of the absolutely great is a measure that the mind 
cannot wholly encompass.
20
 Applied to a terrorist act, its effects and 
consequences cannot be fully described or even mentally encompassed 
and are incommensurable. Its material consequences in the form of 
physical destruction and social disruption, the scope of the human anguish 
inflicted, and the protective measures and reciprocal violence wreaked 
upon society in reaction can never be fully enumerated. Its human 
consequences are immeasurable because they are incalculable. We may 
indeed say that we cannot quantify the destructive force of a terrorist 
attack: it evokes the mathematical sublime. 
The second, Kant's dynamical sublime, concerns the fear we feel in 
response to the enormous might of nature, although we must nonetheless 
feel personally secure and unthreatened, able to rise above that fear and 
not be subject to it. Ironically, even war, Kant avers, has something 
sublime in it if carried on with order and respect for citizens' rights,
21
 
presumably by protecting non-combatants. In the place of might in Kant's 
dynamical sublime, the sublime in terrorism is present in the intensity of 
physical force, in its engulfing emotional power, in the overwhelming 
psychological pressure of the situation.  
Like Kant’s dynamical sublime, the effectiveness of terrorism lies in 
its potential threat to safety and in the very insecurity and social instability 
that result. In terrorism safety is especially equivocal: while there may be 
non-combatants, everyone is vulnerable. The actual victims are but 
sacrificial lambs for their effect on the larger population. Another 
important similarity is in the fact that, like the quantitative forms of the 
Kantian sublime in which both magnitude and might (as force) seem to be 
                                                 
18 Ibid., Part Two, Section II, p. 54. 
19 Critique of Judgment, §28. 
20 Ibid., §27.  
21 Ibid., §28. "War itself, if it is carried on with order and with a sacred respect for 
the rights of citizens, has something sublime in it, and makes the disposition of the 
people who carry it on thus only the more sublime, the more numerous are the 
dangers to which they are exposed and in respect of which they behave with 
courage." p. 102. 
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immeasurable, the intensity of the terrorist sublime is also immeasurable and 
its dimensions indeterminate. And it results in consequences that are 
qualitatively indeterminable and thus incomparable. Only in their 
circumstances and means are the acts and effects of terrorism distinguishable. 
Since both the scope and the intensity of terrorist attacks are beyond 
conception, both morally and aesthetically, we need a new concept, the 
"negative sublime," as their truest and most eloquent identification. 
Because acts of terrorism elude meaningful quantitative determination, 
we must further acknowledge their moral and aesthetic incommensurability, 
indeed, their very inconceivability. Perhaps the only concept that can 
adequately categorize them is the negative sublime. Like the aesthetic, the 
sublime is not necessarily a positive determination but a mode of 
experience. Hence to consider acts of terrorism instances of the negative 
sublime is not an oxymoron but the recognition of negativity whose 
enormity cannot be encompassed in either magnitude or force. The 
uniqueness of such extreme actions renders them capable of description 
only. One might claim that an act of terrorism exemplifies the post-modern 
sublime as Lyotard described it, in making the unpresentable perceptible.
22
 
And because the moral and the aesthetic are inseparable here, the negative 
sublime incurs identical aesthetic and moral value. That the moral is also 
aesthetic makes it even more intolerable. Death is the ultimate human loss, 
and body counts and statistics are deceptively specific and impersonal. 
Such qualitative consequences as the human suffering from extreme acts 
of terrorism are beyond measure. "After the first death, there is no other."
23
 
Acknowledging that there may be an aesthetic in acts of terrorism, 
even a positive aesthetic, does not condone or justify such action, for in 
terrorism the aesthetic never stands alone. Recognizing its presence may 
help us understand the peculiar fascination that the public has with such 
events of world theater. These are indeed acts of high drama that fascinate 
us by their very sublimity.
24
 But the theatrical forcefulness that impresses 
                                                 
22 There is a resemblance here to Lyotard’s characterization of the sublime as 
making `the unpresentable perceptible. “The art object no longer bends itself to 
models, but tries to present the fact that there is an unpresentable….” Cf. Jean-
François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (1979) 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), p. 81; “The sublime and the 
avant-garde,” in The Lyotard Reader, ed. Andrew Benjamin (Blackwell: 
Cambridge, MA, 1989), p. 207. 
23 "A Refusal to Mourn the Death, by Fire, of a Child in London," in The Collected 
Poems of Dylan Thomas (New York: New Directions, 1957), p.112. 
24 “…far from articulating the need of personal expression on the artistic level, art 
becomes fully politicized as an agency that acts on its own in the social sphere, 
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us with their image is indissolubly bound up with their moral negativity, 
and identifying them as the negative sublime is to condemn them beyond 
all measure. As an agent here in the social sphere, art affects the world 
directly. Indeed, “by attacking reality, art becomes reality.” 25  
Terrorism dramatically exposes the inseparability of the moral and the 
aesthetic, yet this is an extreme form of what is always the case. Utopian 
thought, to turn to the other side of the normative ledger, also has a strong 
aesthetic component. Utopianism is pervaded by moral values of social 
and environmental harmony and fulfilment. Its goal of facilitating living 
that is deeply satisfying through the fruitful exercise of human capacities 
is as aesthetic as it is moral.
26
 To conform to the tradition that separates 
the aesthetic from the moral mirrors its segregation from everyday life and 
constricts its force. Let us see the picture whole and not in parts.  
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